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CASES NOTED
LIBEL: A TWO-TIERED CONSTITUTIONAL STANDARD
American Opinion,' a magazine of the John Birch Society, pub-
lished an article claiming that the murder trial of a Chicago police
officer was a frame-up and part of a nationwide Communist conspir-
acy to discredit the police. The article falsely accused Elmer Gertz, a
reputable Chicago attorney retained in civil litigation against the
officer, of being a principal architect of the "frame-up," a "Leninist"
and a "Communist-fronter." '2 A reprint of this article was handed to
his law partner's wife while she was shopping, and soon afterward
Gertz initiated a diversity action 3 for libel4 in the United States Dis-
trict Court for the Northern District of Illinois. The jury awarded him
$50,000, but the District Court set aside the verdict and granted
defendant's motion for judgment n.o.v., holding that the constitutional
privilege enunciated in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan5 applied to
discussion of any matter of public interest even though private indi-
viduals such as Gertz might be defamed. 6 Gertz appealed to the Court
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, which affirmed the District Court,7
citing the Supreme Court's intervening decision in Rosenbloom v.
Metromedia, Inc. 8 On certiorari, the United States Supreme Court
held, reversed and remanded: The New York Times protection does
1. Published by respondent Robert Welch, Inc.
2. In addition to being called a Communist and a conspirator, Gertz was charged with
having a criminal record, being an official of the "Marxist League for Industrial Democracy," and
being an officer of the National Lawyers Guild which was described as a Communist front
organization primarily responsible for planning the Communist attack on Chicago police during
the 1968 Democratic convention.
3. The office of American Opinion's managing editor was in Boston. Gertz claimed that he
had been injured in his professional reputation and practice by defendant's publications, and
sought actual damages of $10,001 and punitive damages of $500,000 in each of two counts. Gertz
v. Robert Welch, Inc., 306 F. Supp. 310 (N.D. Ill. 1969).
4. Gertz brought the action under Illinois libel law. In ruling on defendant's motion to
dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, the District Court held that
causing prejudice to a person in his profession or trade by falsely labeling him a Communist
established a per se case of defamation under Illinois law and that plaintiff was not, therefore,
required to plead special damages. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 306 F. Supp. 310, 311 (N.D. Ill.
1969).
5. 376 U.S. 254 (1964) [hereinafter referred to as New York Times], holding that a public
official may not recover damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless
he proves the statement was made with actual malice or reckless disregard for the truth.
6. After finding that the defendant, albeit negligent, had not acted with actual malice or in
reckless disregard of the truth, the court relied in part on Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 415
F.2d 892 (3d Cir. 1969) for its holding. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 322 F. Supp. 997, 999 (N.D.
III. 1970).
7. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 471 F.2d 801 (7th Cir. 1972).
8. 403 U.S. 29 (1971) [hereinafter referred to as Rosenbloom], holding that when a matter of
public or general interest is published, a private individual may recover for a libel only if he can
prove that the publication was made with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard
for the truth.
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not extend to publishers or broadcasters of defamatory falsehoods
about private individuals, but states may not impose liability without
fault, may not permit recovery of punitive damages when liability is
not based on knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the truth,
and may not allow compensation other than on evidence of actual
injury when liability is established under a less demanding standard
than the New York Times test. 9 Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 94 S. Ct.
2997 (1974).
Beginning with New York Times, and for a decade thereafter, l0
the Supreme Court has recognized a basic conflict between the law of
defamation and the first amendment, particularly when matters of
public interest are involved.'' From the first, the Court's thrust 12 has
been to promote "uninhibited, robust, and wide-open debate"'13 by
providing publishers and broadcasters "breathing space"'14 so that
undesirable self-censorship did not result from fear of potentially crip-
pling libel judgments. To that end the Court gradually broadened the
New York Times standard 5 to protect any medium 16 from assault by
any plaintiff involved in a matter of general or public interest' 7 unless
it knowingly published a defamatory falsehood or did so with reckless
disregard for the truth.' 8 A balance strongly in favor of first amend-
ment rights was struck.
In Gertz the Court clearly does not abandon its goal of avoiding
self-censorship by the media, but by drawing from the Rosenbloom
standard with the one hand and giving back only a little with the
other, the Court has significantly reworked the balance to the detri-
ment of free press and speech. 19 First, the Court retracted the scope of
9. The case was remanded "[b]ecause the jury was allowed to impose liability without fault
and was permitted to presume damages without proof of injury .... " 94 S. Ct. at 3013.
10. For a comprehensive history of the development of the law of defamation during this
period, see, e.g., Comment, Times to Rosenbloom: A Press Free from Libel--The Editors Speak,
27 U. MIAMI L. REV. 109 (1972); Comment, The Expanding Constitutional Protection for the
News Media from Liability for Defamation: Predictability and the New Synthesis, 70 MICH. L.
REv. 1547 (1972) [hereinafter cited as MICHIGAN]. See generally W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF
TORTS §§ 111-16 (4th ed. 1971).
11. Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 44 (1971) (opinion of Brennan, J.).
12. For a list of the most important defamation cases decided by the Supreme Court, see id.
at 30 n.1.
13. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
14. Id. at 272.
15. See note 5 supra.
16. Although the Court does not directly consider the issue, there is good reason to believe
that the New York Times privilege extends to private individuals and institutions as well as to
publishers and broadcasters. See Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 30 (1971);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, Explanatory Notes § 581A, comment h at 137 (Tent. Draft
No. 20, 1974).
17. On the problem of determining what constitutes a "matter of general or public interest,"
see MICHIGAN, supra note 10, at 1560-65.
18. Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 52 (1971).
19. It is significant to note, however, that Ramsey Clark, currently Chairperson of the
National Advisory Council for the A.C.L.U., argued Mr. Rosenbloom's side of the case, and that
the A.C.L.U. has officially adopted a position in favor of permitting private individuals to
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the New York Times privilege to leave the media with protection only
in cases concerning public officials or public figures. Then, the Court
provided a set of constitutionally based rules to effectively limit the
amount of damages that might be recovered by persons in a libel
action.2 0 In effect, the Court created a two-tiered constitutional stan-
dard for libel law, the first tier being the New York Times privilege
that may be invoked in libel actions involving plaintiffs with public
status, 2 1 and the second being the Gertz rule, a less vigorous protection
of publishers and broadcasters from liability and damages when injury
is claimed by plaintiffs of private status.
Aside from the substantial contraction of its scope, the first tier
remains essentially unchanged by the Gertz decision. So long as the
press and broadcasters do not knowingly publish defamatory false-
hoods or recklessly disregard the truth, they have protection against
libel actions by public officials and public figures. If a plaintiff does
establish liability, 22 the proof and measure of damages apparently
remains as before. 23
The second tier, however, presents an entirely new situation. As
Justice White states in his dissent, Gertz federalizes "major aspects of
libel law by declaring unconstitutional in important respects the pre-
vailing defamation law in all or most of the 50 States.1 24 First, it
prevents the states from imposing liability without fault.25 Justice
Powell implicitly assumes that negligence will be the basis of liability
employed by most or all states, although the option remains open to
adopt other bases such as the New York Times rule or the complete
elimination of libel, as previously suggested by Justice Black.2 6
recover in libel actions. F. HAIMAN, THE FIRST FREEDOMS: SPEECH PRESS ASSEMBLY 23 (1972).
See T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 517-62 (1970). But see Warren and
Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 214-16 (1890).
20. But the Court "took" from those private citizens who might have occasion to bring a
libel action not arising out of a matter of general or public interest. Prior to Gertz no restrictions
on damages applied to their suits.
21. On the determination of which plaintiffs have public status, see Note, The Invasion of
Defamation by Privacy, 23 STAN. L. REV. 547, 565 (1971). A possible inference from this Note is
that the current Court, in future cases, might further diminish the scope of the New York Times
privilege by limiting the "public" plaintiff category to those who "either voluntarily [enter] the
forum of discussion . . . or voluntarily [attain] a position that invites public attention." Id.
(emphasis added). Consider Justice Powell's statement: "Hypothetically, it may be possible for
someone to become a public figure through no purposeful action of his own, but the instances of
truly involuntary public figures must be exceedingly rare . 94 S. Ct. at 3009 (emphasis
added).
22. On the problem of the meaning of "actual malice," see MICHIGAN, supra note 10, at
1565-67, 1573.
23. See generally Arkin and Granquist, The Presumption of General Damages in the Law of
Constitutional Libel, 68 COLUM. L. REV. 1482 (1968).
24. 94 S. Ct. at 3022.
25. For an explanation of strict liability in the common law of defamation, see
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, Explanatory Notes § 580, comment b at 122 (Tent. Draft
No. 20, 1974).
26. E.g., Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 170-72 (1967) (concurring opinion);
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 293-97 (1964) (concurring opinion). See generally
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Gertz also prohibits the award of punitive damages, usually the
most significant component of damages in a libel suit, 27 unless knowl-
edge of falsity or reckless disregard for the truth is shown. This leaves
most plaintiffs with compensation only for actual damages 2 8
and delivers all but perhaps the smallest of newspapers or broadcast
stations from fear of financial collapse because of libel actions. 29
Third, Gertz requires proof that actual injury occurred as a result
of the libel unless the "actual malice" test of New York Times is met.
Justice Powell offers some elucidation of the meaning of "actual in-
jury":
Suffice it to say that actual injury is not limited to out-of-
pocket loss. Indeed, the more customary types of actual harm
inflicted by defamatory falsehood include impairment of
reputation and standing in the community, personal humilia-
tion, and mental anguish and suffering. 30
He also comments on the required proof: "[AIll awards must be sup-
ported by competent evidence concerning the injury, although there
need be no evidence which assigns an actual dollar value to the
injury."'3 1
The reasons behind the creation of this second constitutional tier
appear to be the very ones rejected by the Rosenbloom plurality. In
Gertz, Justice Powell declares:
We would not lightly require the State to abandon [its le-
gitimate interest in compensating individuals injured by
defamation] for . . . the individual's right to protection of his
own good name . . . [is] "a concept at the root of any decent
system of ordered liberty."'32
Justice Brennan pointed out in Rosenbloom, however, that
The New York Times standard was applied to libel of a
public official or public figure to give effect to the [First]
Amendment's function to encourage ventilation of public is-
sues, not because the public official has any less interest in
protecting his reputation than an individual in private life. 33
T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 624-26 (1970); Cahn, Justice Black and
First Amendment "Absolutes": A Public Interview, 37 N.Y.U.L. REV. 549 (1962); Kalven, The
Reasonable Man and the First Amendment: Hill, Butts, and Walker, 1967 SuP. CT. REV. 267,
292-95.
27. 94 S. Ct. 2997 (1974). Gertz demanded $10,000 compensatory damages, as compared to
$1,000,000 punitive. See also Rosenbloom (claim for $25,000 compensatory; $725,000 punitive);
Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967) (claim for $60,000 compensatory; $3,000,000
punitive); New York Times ($500,000 total claim).
28. Although, in the absence of proof of actual damages, nominal damages are clearly
possible if liability is established.
29. The cost of litigation is also important here.
30. 94 S. Ct. at 3012.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 3008, citing Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 92-93 (1963).
33. Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 46 (1971).
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Justice Powell argues that private individuals are more vulnerable to
injury by false statements because they do not have access to the
"channels of effective communication" enjoyed by public figures.3 4 Yet
Justice Brennan noted that
In the vast majority of libels involving public officials or
public figures, the ability to respond through the media will
depend on the same complex factor on which the ability of a
private individual depends: the unpredictable event of the
media's continuing interest in the story.35
Justice Powell completes his argument by suggesting that "public
officials and public figures have voluntarily exposed themselves to
increased risk of injury from defamatory falsehoods, '36 while private
individuals have not. But Justice Brennan recognized that
Voluntarily or not, we are all "public" men to some degree.
...[T]he idea that certain "public" figures have voluntarily
exposed their entire lives to public inspection, while private
individuals have kept theirs carefully shrouded from public
view is, at best, a legal fiction. 37
Thus, there was no new reasoning behind the decision to remove
private individuals from the scope of the New York Times privilege. 38
More than anything else, the decision reflects the change in the Court's
composition subsequent to the Rosenbloom decision. 39
Nor was there much new thinking in the constitutional limitations
imposed on state libel actions. 40 The idea that states should not be
allowed to impose liability without fault and that only actual damages
should be recoverable was fully developed in the dissenting opinions of
Justices Marshall and Harlan in Rosenbloom. 4 1 Once again, change in
the composition of the Court was the determinative factor.
On first sight the decision does not seem too ominous for pub-
lishers and broadcasters. 42 The threat of large judgments because of
punitive damages has been eradicated. Publication of defamatory
falsehoods about anyone must be made at least negligently, and actual
34. 94 S. Ct. at 3009.
35. Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 46 (1971).
36. 94 S. Ct. at 3010.
37. Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 48 (1971).
38. For example, much more consideration could have been given to the alternatives to
damages. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, Special Note on Alternative Remedies to
Damages at 295-97 (Tent. Draft No. 20, 1974).
39. Justice Powell and Justice Rehnquist joined the Court subsequent to Rosenbloom. Most
likely their presence was a significant factor in Justice Blackmun's change of position.
40. Sections 580 and 621 of Tentative Draft No. 20 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts
anticipated all three constitutional prohibitions on the basis of previous opinions of the Court.
One law review commentator had even analyzed the potential defects of such prohibitions prior
to the Gertz decision. Note, The Supreme Court, 1970 Term, 85 HARV. L. REv. 38, 228 (1971).
41. 403 U.S. at 62-87 (1971).
42. At least one member of the media saw it that way. TIME, July 8, 1974, at 58.
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harm must be proved in court before any compensatory damages can
be recovered, a task traditionally recognized as difficult.4 3
Yet a constitutional decision such as this was not made without
reason. 44 Despite the burdens for a particular plaintiff, he now has a
much better chance of "stinging" the media with a lawsuit. With the
privilege of publishers and broadcasters removed, a private citizen can
quite easily get a jury trial because the direction of recent cases has
been to view all libel as actionable per se. 45 Even if he doesn't recover
the damages allowed under the new standard and vindicate himself in
the process, he is still able to harass the defendant with a trial. 4 6
More importantly, Gertz reverses an attitude. The lower courts,4 7
plaintiff's attorneys, 4 8 law review commentators, 4 9 and even the
American Law Institute5 ° have assumed that the New York Times
privilege pre-empted the field of defamation except in the rarest of
cases. The decision will encourage potential plaintiffs and their attor-
neys to be bold, with the likely result that many more publishers and
broadcasters will find themselves defendants in libel actions in the
years ahead.
BRADFORD SWING
IRS PREVENTED FROM SEIZING DOCUMENTS:
ATTORNEY ASSERTS CLIENT'S FIFTH
AMENDMENT PRIVILEGE
Dr. Mason, a taxpayer, was visited by Special Agents of the
Internal Revenue Service, who informed him that his tax returns were
under investigation. He immediately called his accountant, defendant
Candy, who advised Dr. Mason not to show any of his records to the
agents. Defendant Candy then called defendant Kasmir, an attorney,
43. W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS § 112, at 765 (4th ed. 1971).
44. Justice Blackmun suggested that it was to resolve the "uncertainty" of a "sadly fraction-
ated" Court in Rosenbloom. 94 S. Ct. at 3014.
45. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, Explanatory Notes § 569, at 59 (Tent. Draft No.
20, 1974). It is interesting to note that the Supreme Court's decision to prohibit imposition of
strict liability has removed the basis for the per se/per quod controversy, and thus has ended the
matter. Id.
46. Note that the burden of proving truth lies with the defendant once a per se case of libel
is established.
47. For a list of decisions by lower courts assuming the Rosenbloom plurality opinion to
have become the established law, see Note, Misinterpreting the Supreme Court: An Analysis of
How the Constitutional Privilege to Defame Has Been Incorrectly Expanded, 10 IDAHO L. REV.
213, 217 (1974).
48. On the attitude of attorneys, see id.
49. One commentator expressed support of the standard ultimately adopted in Gertz, but
seemed resigned to the inevitability of the Rosenbloom, or even of Justice Black's, standard.
Note, The Supreme Court, 1970 Term, 85 HARV. L. REV. 38, 227-28 (1971).
50. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, Chapter 24A, at 133-45 (Tent. Draft No. 20, 1974).
